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Pledging Peace in Aldous Huxley’s
Eyeless in Gaza
Charles Andrews
Whitworth University
Nineteen thirty-six was a pivotal year for Aldous Huxley. Much of his energy prior to this year was spent writing the satirical novels upon which his
reputation still rests, including Crome Yellow (1921), Point Counter Point
(1928), and Brave New World (1932). Huxley produced many of his nearly
fifty books under contractual obligations to write two or even three books
per year, a pace that seemed to cause him little concern. Yet Eyeless in Gaza,
his under-read masterpiece, took four years to complete. Begun in 1932,
published in 1936, Eyeless is in most ways typical of Huxley’s fiction—erudite, philosophical, and semi-autobiographical. His title alludes to Milton’s
Samson Agonistes, and his characters each take competing positions on the
issues most important to Huxley and his cohort of artists and intellectuals:
human relations, mystical spirituality, and radical politics. Eyeless in Gaza
also shows off some of Huxley’s most formally adventurous writing, particularly with regard to narrative chronology. Each of the novel’s fifty-four
chapters is set on a specific day between November 6, 1902 and February
23, 1935. Lacking any readily discernible regular pattern, the chapters jump
back and forth within this thirty-three year range. The earliest dates show
our main character Anthony Beavis as a young boy at his mother’s funeral,
by the 1910s we see him at Oxford, by the 1920s Anthony is a struggling
writer, and by the 1930s he is in a love affair with Helen, is briefly involved
in a Mexican revolution, and ultimately converts to pacifism.
Many critics focus on the novel’s form, treating its convolutions as a
stand-alone point of interest divorced from content.1 The avant-garde time
structure of the novel was part of the reason for Huxley’s struggle with the
text, and the consistent critical attention to this feature is understandable.
In February of 1934 Huxley wrote to Mary Hutchinson, saying:
I dodder along with my book, rather exasperated because I can’t quite get the formal relations
between parts that I’m looking for…I am looking
for a device to present two epochs of a life simultaneously so as to show their relations with one
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another—and also their lack of relationship. For
when one considers life one is equally struck by
both facts—that one has remained the same and
become totally different. (Letters 292)
Staging a contradictory, even self-defeating, narrative of discovery was
Huxley’s goal, but his aims were more than just producing a formally flashy
Bildungsroman. The composition of this book may be seen as a form of
spiritual discipline, a key component of his own conversion to pacifism
as an article of faith. With Eyeless in Gaza, Huxley seemed to mark a new
aesthetic, philosophical, and political direction. It is this new direction I will
explore here to show how 1936 was not only a turning point for Huxley but
also for the peace movement in the build-up to World War II. Huxley’s pacifist activism provides a context for his narrative experiments that may allow
us to better understand his complicated expression of a newfound politics.
Critics attentive to this new politics often diverge from formalist
readings by regarding the book as essentially equivalent to the pacifist tracts
Huxley wrote during the same period. George Woodcock confesses the
disillusionment he felt with Huxley when as a young man he read Eyeless
and found its narrative of “conversion to mystical religion” to be Huxley’s
suggestion “with obvious didactic intent—that such a spiritual evolution
was not merely compatible with the pacifist and decentralist politics which
he had recently been preaching in print and on public platforms, but was
perhaps the only condition under which they could become effective” (3).
In this interpretation, Huxley’s supposed didacticism—made especially
repellent by espousing a suspicious and/or foolish creed—overwhelms
the novel’s formal innovations and undermines Huxley’s credentials as a
prophet for some new libertarian society.
Disillusionment about Huxley among his peers seems to have been
matched by his self-disillusion. His new political project was apparently
short-lived. By 1938 he had abandoned Britain for the United States, where
he lived the rest of his life as a screenwriter, public intellectual, narcotics
voyager, and counter-cultural sage. But before entering this last phase of
his life and career, at the pivot point of 1936, Huxley sought an integrated
life of literary expression, personal discipline, and public peace activism. My
argument here aims to show how Huxley’s experimental literary pursuits,
rather than being a separate function of his intellectual interests, were essential to his peace activism in the 1930s and to his on-going search for a
coherent and totalizing system for living life well. Moreover, I take issue
with the claims of Huxley’s contemporaries and later critics that Eyeless in
Gaza is merely didactic. The avant-garde form permits a much more tentative, complicated politics to emerge, one that presents self-questioning at
the core of even a very active political effort toward peacemaking.
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Beyond “Case-Hardened”
Huxley’s efforts to achieve his philosophical goals were a large part of his
celebrity as a public intellectual and the last remnant of the Victorian Sages
in the tradition of his grandfather Thomas Henry Huxley and his great
uncle Matthew Arnold. Many of his practices have aged rather badly, such
as his disastrous commitment to a quack who taught that physical exercises
could cure his blindness.2 Critical evaluations of his life tend to include his
pacifist opposition to the Second World War in the same category as his
other dubious, shameful, or laughable convictions. After all, Huxley’s stated
goal for human existence sounds less trenchant than his prophecies about
social mechanization and insularity produced by technology. In his book
Ends and Means he described “the ideal goal of human effort” as “liberty,
peace, justice and brotherly love,” and so demonstrates the difficulty of
naming foundational values without cliché (1).
Many readers have detected in Huxley’s inability to articulate a true
Utopian vision (as he unsuccessfully attempted in his final novel, Island) the
vestiges of his privileged, snobbish, satisfied life. Christopher Hitchens, in
his less than glowing foreword to Brave New World calls the book “didactic
and pedagogic and faintly superior” and written in “the tone of voice of an
Etonian schoolmaster. It is also somewhat contradictory and even selfdefeating” (xi). Thus, even Huxley’s most widely read novel is packaged as
a kind of smug failure. While the charges of superiority and didacticism in
Huxley’s works are not entirely refutable, it is at least worth noting that he
was self-conscious about these problems. He frequently observed that he was
not gifted as a first-rate novelist, and in 1925 he wrote to Mary Hutchinson
that “I have lived so long and so exclusively in a private literary-intellectual
world, that I am case-hardened” (qtd. in Murray 171).
This “case-hardening” and intellectual isolation dogged Huxley
throughout his life, but his peace work in the mid-1930s can be seen as
his most substantial effort to push beyond his elitist milieu and to engage political realities. In 1934, while Huxley was still wrestling with his
unfinished novel, he began active involvement with the most important
affiliation of his political life: the Peace Pledge Union. The genesis of this
activist group was a sermon by the prominent liberal clergyman Harry
Emerson Fosdick of New York City, who preached on Armistice Sunday of
1933 about renouncing war “for its consequences, the lies it lives on and
propagates, for the undying hatred it arouses, for the dictatorships it puts
in the place of democracy” (qtd. in Morrison 8). This charge was taken up
whole-heartedly by the well-known Anglican Canon H.R.L. Sheppard who
published an open letter in the Manchester Guardian on October 16, 1934,
inviting men to join the largely female peace movement by signing this
resolution: “We renounce war and never again, directly or indirectly, will
we support or sanction another” (qtd. in Morrison 100). By the second day
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after this publication, thousands of postcards had arrived at Sheppard’s
door, including one from Aldous Huxley.
The 1920s had seen a proliferation of anti-war and pacifist movements with names like the No More War Movement and the No Conscription
Fellowship, but few were as large as the PPU, which at its peak claimed about
136,000 members.3 Part of the reason for this growth was the deliberate
minimalism of its official requirements; membership entailed simply signing
the one sentence resolution. The openness of its official pledge allowed antiwar people of all stripes to unite. Early members included former soldiers
like Siegfried Sassoon and Edmund Blunden, Marxists like John Middleton
Murry, Christian pacifists like Rose Macaulay, and many other artists, intellectuals, and religious leaders including Storm Jameson, Bertrand Russell,
Max Plowman, and Vera Brittain. The broad appeal of the PPU also, perhaps,
constituted its liability, since there was no consensus about the basis for the
membership’s pacifism nor (more importantly) were there consistent ideas
about how the group should proceed. Within the broad umbrella category
of “anti-war movements” were internationalists who believed that a multinational police force was the best hope for peaceful coexistence, and these
members might work alongside Tolstoyan, absolute pacifists who resisted
any form of coercion.
The history of the British peace movement between the world wars
is quite complex and marked by arcane disputes, unseemly alliances, and
ultimate failure. Even the name “British peace movement” is somewhat
misleading since it is a catchall description for the many small pacifist and
anti-war groups who are linked only by a similar ultimate objective. Historical studies of pacifist groups between the world wars tend to portray
their efforts as, at best, sincere but misguided and at worst contributors
to the Third Reich’s victories.4 After all, the twentieth century is notable
for its unsurpassed bloodshed rather than its remarkable narratives of
prevention. However, recent scholarship has begun to uncover the lesser
known counter-narratives to the dominant histories of totalitarianism.
Jay Winter describes the many “openings” in the twentieth century where
“minor utopias” emerged and briefly gave hope for possibilities of peace (2).
Events like the 1937 Paris World’s Fair used art and technology as a means
toward unifying people through exhibiting the best of human creativity. It
was here that Picasso’s Guernica was displayed, proclaiming what he called
his “abhorrence of the military caste which has sunk Spain into an ocean
of pain and death” (qtd. in Winter 83). And the centerpiece of the fair was
its Pavilion of Peace representing the horrors of war and offering a venue
for international veterans of World War One to announce their commitment to nonviolence. Winter’s description of the expo also examines the
contradictions and “eloquent silences” of this pacifist display, noting the
space granted to Nazi and British imperialist propaganda. These failures
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tell us much about the limitations of peaceful internationalism, but also
suggest the lengths to which well-meaning people throughout Europe desired to amend for the tragedy of the Great War and prevent its duplication.
The PPU, which failed to achieve its primary objective—the prevention of
another war—inhabits a place in twentieth-century history much like that
occupied by the Paris expo. Minor, perhaps, but not insignificant. The minor
utopian energies were eclipsed by what Winter calls the “major utopias”
perpetrated by Hitler and Stalin, and public memory has lost sight of much
of the optimism felt by anti-war advocates in the mid-1930s who saw their
numbers increasing and believed that alternatives to war were possible (1).
Two key facts are neglected in the simplified narrative that regards
1930s British pacifists as mere appeasers or fascist sympathizers. The first
is the evidence that Britons on the whole were widely in favor of nonviolent
collective security. Absolute pacifism was (and remains) a minority position,
but in the years between the world wars the general British public believed
that international efforts to curtail violence without submitting to militaristic nations was the ideal. David Cortright describes the effectiveness of the
Peace Ballot campaign, which was “one of the largest and most successful
mobilizations of peace sentiment in history” (77). This campaign polled an
astonishing 38% of adult British people about their views regarding the
League of Nations, decrease of armaments, abolition of military and naval
aircraft, and other measures seeking international and cooperative forms of
collective security and violence reduction. The Peace Ballot was conducted
during 1934 and 1935 by the League of Nations Union (LNU) and shows
that realistic peace-minded measures were supported by the majority of
those surveyed.5 In other words, only absolute pacifism should be seen as
eccentric while during the 1930s war resistance was normative, although
there was little consensus about precisely what this resistance should look
like in practice.
The second key fact in revising the stereotypical view of 1930s
pacifism pertains to the frequently raised problem of appeasement. Cecelia
Lynch has shown that scholarly assessments of pacifism often overlook the
fact that “there was no clear official alternative in the early (or late) 1930s to
peace movement positions,” and the Tories as well as Ramsay MacDonald’s
National government espoused no path other than “passivity” (96). The
notion that peace activists were unified in favor of appeasement or simple
concession to Hitler’s aggression denies the substantial efforts by the peace
movement to counteract the imminent world war through nonviolent means.
Many peace activists were the first to insist upon collective security rather
than the concessions of leaders like Neville Chamberlain.6
In the years leading up to the Second World War, a large percentage of the British populace held anti-war convictions, including a belief in
the need to reduce armaments. What exactly this anti-war position meant
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in practice was quite varied, of course, and the general resistance to future
conflicts did not clarify the ambivalence about methods and core beliefs.
Beyond broadly stated conviction, disputes emerged among and within
various organizations attempting to provide a voice for nonviolent politics.
Martin Ceadel categorizes the many twentieth-century British peace groups
based on two features: “inspiration or basis” and “orientation or attitude
towards society and the problem of war prevention” (Pacifism in Britain
11). Many forms of inspiration for pacifism appeared to be in direct conflict,
and unlikely partnerships were made of people such as sectarian Christians
who believed in special revelations from God and Marxian communists who
saw international violence as an obstacle to class-based progress. Alongside
these differing motivations, orientation may have been an even more serious
obstacle to the uniformity of the British peace movement. After all, strange
bedfellows are by definition united through common objectives rather than
common bases. Much as 1936 was a watershed year for Huxley’s art and
politics, that year marked the high point of the peace movement, and from
a certain perspective its last great moment before lengthy decline. Ceadel
observes that widespread polarization occurred in the peace movement and
in Britain at large because of three crucial events: German remilitarization
of the Rhineland, Italian conquest of Abyssinia, and eruption of the Spanish
Civil War.7 This triple threat to British non-violence provoked heated debates
about accommodation, appeasement, sanctions, and rearmament. Internal
polarization—mirroring the polarization of British popular opinion—would
severely diminish the effectiveness of the PPU and lead to its collapse as a
serious voice in the national dialogue.8
Huxley became a key figure in the pacifist literature of the time,
and his reputation parallels that of the peace movement—rising success
and popularity through the 1920s, peaking in the mid-1930s, and suffering
considerable decline in the years since. The exact reasons for Huxley’s initial
interest in the PPU remain somewhat mysterious. One of the challenges
for any research on Huxley is the fire that swept through his California
home in 1961, consuming much of his personal writing and letters. But we
can infer that the elimination of war was a major component of a larger
project: his restless search for a totalizing philosophy sufficient to renew
society in radical ways. We can also determine a few important events and
intellectual discoveries that shaped Huxley’s thought. In his youth, Huxley
twice attempted to enlist in British armed service during the First World
War, but he failed the medical examinations due to his eye conditions. As
the war dragged on, he became a conscientious objector and performed
alternative service at Garsington Manor, Lady Ottoline Morrell’s estate,
clearing brush and doing other yardwork, sharing this post with Bertrand
Russell and John Middleton Murry.9 Russell’s pacifist writings, particularly
his Principles of Social Reconstruction (also called Why Men Fight) writ-
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ten in 1916, were early influences on Huxley’s thought. Also crucial to his
political and spiritual formation was his friendship with Gerald Heard, the
philosopher and ethicist with whom he intended to co-author his treatise
Ends and Means (1937).10
But despite dabbling in pacifism through the 1920s, Huxley’s convictions were not especially ardent until the mid-1930s with his reading of
Richard Gregg’s The Power of Nonviolence (1934) and his joining of the
Peace Pledge Union. Gregg was a disciple of Gandhi who sought to translate
Gandhi’s practices into western contexts, and his writings influenced many
in the peace movement, though “Greggism,” as his theories were sometimes
called, sparked controversy among peace activists for its hint of superstition
and spiritualism.11 The basic premise of Gregg’s system was “moral jiu-jitsu”
which avoids counter-violence and instead “offers resistance, but only in
moral terms” (44). This highly disciplined, Eastern influenced, meditative
system that required great personal fortitude and stamina was precisely
the methodology Huxley desired. The traits promoted by Gregg manifest in
Eyeless in Gaza as the noteworthy characteristics of the novel’s guru-figures
and the aspirations of its protagonist, Anthony Beavis.
Huxley tested the waters gradually, refusing at first to speak publicly about his peace work as he hoped to avoid what he called “a campaign
of religious and ethical preaching against war” (qtd. in Dunaway 17). But
under continued pressure from Heard to enact what was becoming known
as the “New Pacifism,” Huxley moved closer towards that very preaching
and religiosity that he initially avoided.12
As he was becoming more invested in the PPU, Huxley witnessed
a Blackshirt rally on June 7, 1935, with Oswald Mosley speaking. Civil protestors at the event were beaten by Mosley supporters in front of Huxley, a
brutal reminder that nonviolent activism carried serious consequences and
that Huxley’s pacifism was not merely formed in a world of abstract ideas
secured by his privileged isolation. In his first public speech on behalf of
the PPU, Huxley acknowledged the need for all people to face the empirical
realities of violence: “Warlike passions burn most fiercely in minds which
think about the problems of peace and war in terms of generalizations and
abstractions…when those human beings are thought of merely as members
of a class which has previously been defined as evil, then killing becomes
a simple matter” (qtd. in Dunaway 21). This statement suggests not only
a personal, ethical position, but also commends the novelist’s art to the
realm of peace activism by working always in specifics. The attention paid
in Eyeless in Gaza to Anthony and his soul’s journey may be an effort to
generate sympathy for an enemy class, the peace worker whose views are
deemed disastrous and even treasonous.
Anthony’s spiritual and political journey shows the influence of
Huxley’s own mentors and a willingness to embrace positions disdained by
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the mainstream religious and national institutions. A key figure for Huxley,
as for many PPU members, was their leader Dick Sheppard whose personal
charisma has often been noted as a persuasive force over those who knew
him. For founding members like Sybil Morrison, Sheppard’s untimely death
in October of 1937 was a blow difficult to overcome: “sitting quietly at his
desk with his head upon his arms as though asleep his much strained heart
had given out; Dick Sheppard, that man of many parts was dead, and there
was no-one to replace him” (26). Morrison’s account of the PPU makes
the best of this situation, claiming that the rank and file members were
the true backbone of the organization, but there can be little denying that
Sheppard’s presiding presence was the key energy source for its activism.
Huxley used Sheppard as the model for Reverend John Purchas in Eyeless
in Gaza, whom Anthony describes as someone
who takes Christianity seriously and has started
an organization of pacifists. Purchas by name.
Middle-aged. Slightly the muscular-jocular Christian manner. (How hard to admit that a man can
use clichés and yet be intelligent!)…The aim is to
use and extend Purchas’s organization. The unit
is a small group, like the Early Christian agape, or
the communist cell. (Eyeless 12)
Like Purchas, the real-life Sheppard was adamant that the PPU should
take Christian community and evangelistic techniques as its model, but
that its inspiration should be non-theological. This Christianity emptied of
its theological content and deployed for political or even secular-mystical
ends had great appeal to Huxley for its spirituality unfettered by outworn
tradition or specified deity.
This revisionary, political faith seemed to many of Huxley’s peers
merely idiosyncratic and quirky, and his self-fashioning as a secular mystic
was regarded with derision and even suspicion. Graham Greene wrote in a
book review for the Catholic periodical The Tablet in 1936 that he approved
Cyril Connolly’s parody of Huxley as a man “gone a little ‘gamey’ and on
the verge of discovering pacifism and a personal religion” (95). For Greene,
who took his religion with a heavy dose of obsession and penance, the idea
of Huxley’s ethereal and somewhat amorphous spirituality could only seem
deranged. As Huxley began to publish more widely his newly unfolding beliefs, his arguments opened debates that were erupting throughout Britain
about the impending war. Huxley quickly moved from mere signatory to
leading member of the PPU, writing what would become its first official
tract entitled What Are You Going to Do About it? The Case for Constructive Peace. This essay drew the ire of many people, notably those on the left
like Cecil Day Lewis who published his rejoinder pamphlet called We’re Not
Going to Do Nothing which accused Huxley of constructing “a great, big,

Andrews

Pledging Peace in Aldous Huxley’s Eyeless in Gaza

117

beautiful idealist bubble—lovely to look at, no doubt; charming to live in,
perhaps: but with little reference to the real facts and inadequate protection
against a four-engined bomber” (3).
In addition to the frequent charge of hopeless idealism, pacifism
in the 1930s always has about it the specter of pro-Fascist, pro-Nazi sentiment, the logic being that resistance to war equals concession to tyranny.
Rebecca West later reflected in her book The Meaning of Treason that the
PPU was “that ambiguous organisation which in the name of peace was performing many actions certain to benefit Hitler” (qtd. in Morrison 51).13 The
specific actions Huxley called for seem today less treasonous than naïve, as
Day Lewis pointed out. Huxley saw Italy’s conquest of Abyssinia as clearly
evil, and suggested, simply, that: “the great monopolistic powers should
immediately summon a conference at which the unsatisfied powers, great
and small, should be invited to state their grievance and claims” (What are
you…? 27). Obviously, this grand conference idea never took hold of the
public imagination. But, if nothing else, Huxley’s pamphleteering shows
his abhorrence of the isolationist position as a form of “negative pacifism”
assumed casually, perhaps, by people refusing to fight only because it would
cause their own discomfort. A bad peace, like that achieved in Versailles,
or the events occurring in Abyssinia and Czechoslovakia cannot be the
goal of the constructive pacifist. In his Encyclopaedia of Pacifism, Huxley
wrote that “non-violence does not mean doing nothing. It means making
the enormous effort required to overcome evil with good” (80).14 Or, as he
put it in an earlier speech: “The only hope lies in the pacifists being better
disciplined than the militarists and prepared to put up with as great hardships and dangers with a courage equal to theirs” (qtd. in Dunaway 21).
Huxley Agonistes
In Eyeless in Gaza, pacifism and mysticism coalesce as the engines of that
enormously difficult work required by the agent of active non-violence. Anthony seeks a form of meditation derived from various threads of Catholic
thought interwoven with strands of Buddhism and Hinduism, all of which
will be “Ends in themselves and at the same time means for realizing some
of that goodness in practice” (432). Huxley’s rummaging through a variety
of religious sources for political usefulness echoes other modernists’ search
for religion capable of addressing the needs of a spiritually bankrupt age.
Eliot, Lawrence, Yeats, and Pound all searched in different ways for a revitalized religious presence in modernity, and Huxley expresses through
Anthony something like this preoccupation. However, Huxley foregrounds
the political dimension of this search. While Eliot’s “Shantih Shantih
Shantih” obliquely responds to the lack of peace in Eliot’s world, Huxley
explicitly attends to the political possibilities inherent in religious thought.
On Christmas Day, 1934, Anthony Beavis writes in his journal: “The funda-
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mental problem is practical—to work out systems of psychological exercises
for all types of men and women. Catholicism has many systems of mental
prayer—Ignatian, Franciscan, Liguorian, Carmelite and so on. Hinduism,
Northern, Southern and Zen Buddhism also have a variety of practices.
There is a great work to be done here. Collecting and collating information
from all these sources” (431-32). The practices of various traditions may be
borrowed, stripped of their specific spiritual content (such as worship of a
God), and used for a multifaceted pacifist project responsive to the unique
needs of individual members.
Along with methodological diversity, the centerpiece of Huxley’s
thought as expressed through Anthony is valuation of means rather than
ends. Much of Huxley’s thinking was energized by this ends/means dichotomy, and peace activism, despite its insistence upon creating a nonviolent
world, was for Huxley still a matter of process rather than result. World
peace ceases to be simply a goal, pursued whatever way seems most effective.
Rather, pacifism becomes a faith, a set of practices worthy in themselves and
not undertaken simply because they are productive. Huxley’s voice in this
regard joins other members of the pacifist community, such as Max Plowman, whose book The Faith Called Pacifism articulates the creedal nature
of peace activism: “What now seems to be growing more and more clear is
the realization that peace cannot become the reigning condition so long as
the present order of values obtains. If we want peace we have got to discover
new values, assert our faith in them, and order our activities in accordance
with our faith” (35). One might be tempted to see in Plowman and Huxley’s
views a naïve ideological retrenchment where instead of making a case for
the pacifist position and offering a realistic solution to violence, they simplistically resort to religious fantasy. But I would argue that casting peace
activism in religious terms was a way to reframe the debate about pacifism
beyond what we see in Huxley’s exchange with Day Lewis. Rather than being
a matter of doing something versus doing nothing, peace work becomes the
grounding for a set of life practices undertaken for their inherent goodness
and out of a commitment to a cause beyond oneself. Huxley explained his
theory of religious pacifism in a letter written late in December of 1935:
I have come to the conviction that nothing can
possibly work or get us out of our present state
except complete pacifism of the Quaker or Buddhist kind. The implications of this are, of course,
fundamentally religious…some simpler conception
of an underlying spiritual unity, realized through
the practice of meditation…for it is only by translating the fundamental religious ideas of human
unity into political terms…that we can escape from
destruction. (Selected Letters 313-14)
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Thus, what appears to be personal conviction and private discipline is actually a form of political action.
Eyeless in Gaza demonstrates Huxley’s effort to imagine the possibilities of full-blown commitment to pacifist mysticism. In the novel, Dr.
Miller, the physician/anthropologist/mystic who mirrors Reverend Purchas
by guiding Anthony toward proper spiritual disciplines, counsels him:
“When you pray in the ordinary way, you’re merely rubbing yourself into
yourself. You return to your own vomit, if you see what I mean. Whereas
what we’re all looking for is some way of getting beyond our own vomit”
(423). In Miller’s mouth, Huxley places the very critique that is so often
leveled at his own mystical turn—that it was merely a retreat and an abandonment of the world’s real problems in favor of some introverted escape.
Miller endorses thinking, and eating, like a Buddhist, telling Anthony that
his diet of meat, alcohol, and cigarettes has left him with “intestines … ripe
for fascism and nationalism” (425). The personally disciplined, monastic
lifestyle is thus, paradoxically, a mode of political action. Fighting fascism
begins at home, and in the bowels.
Huxley’s contemporaries, and even partners in the peace movement, found this notion of politicized self-discipline ridiculous. Huxley’s
use of “Greggist” methods proved divisive for even the core members of the
PPU such as Sheppard and Plowman, who ridiculed the training programs
held by Huxley and Gerald Heard as “Yogi-Bogie exercises” (qtd. in Ceadel,
Pacifism 253).15 Huxley’s persistence with these practices was a contributing
factor in the PPU’s diminished capacity to hold sway in public policy. The
popular writer Beverly Nichols, formerly a pacifist fellow-traveler, described
the ranks of pacifists as being filled with “religious cranks, who appeared
at the front door clothed in white draperies, waving banners and proclaiming that they had a Message…medical cranks, who believed that you could
stop man fighting by altering his diet” (10). While Huxley may not seem to
recognize fully the crankish element of his beliefs, he does show through
Dr. Miller his awareness that moral discipline can appear to be little more
than self-indulgence. He counters with an assertion that failing to examine
oneself leaves a person susceptible to the dangerous ideologies of militaristic
nationalism.
Although many of Huxley’s views are expressed by the novel’s characters, the book never devolves into a series of homilies or set of political
tracts. Anthony is clearly a stand-in for Huxley in many ways and shares
many of Huxley’s own views, but the experimental form of the novel accentuates the process of political awakening and the struggle to achieve a
viable pacifist way of life. Huxley may lack the proper sense of irony or even
self-awareness when it comes to his mystical, pacifist politics, but the modernist form of Eyeless in Gaza embeds self-questioning and struggle as core
aspects of Anthony’s journey. Thus criticism of heavy-handed didacticism in
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Eyeless in Gaza (as in Huxley’s other novels) accepts too easily Anthony’s
conversion narrative and diary entries as the unequivocally authoritative
moral answer to the questions posed by Huxley’s narrative form. I argue,
in contrast, that Huxley’s effort to show both progress and stasis through
disjointed chronology renders Anthony’s views part of an on-going process of
accepting pacifist inspiration and developing a workable pacifist orientation.
Jerome McGann has praised Eyeless in Gaza as an under-read gem
in an overlooked strain of modernist writing that shies away from the mythical structures and polished artistry of canonical works like Ulysses. Instead
of a modernism manifested in “an ideal—or a tyranny—of the aesthetic,”
novels like Huxley’s are, for McGann, “a form of writing where failure stalks
in every word” (316). The intensely subjective text evokes Anthony’s failure
to fully commit to his convictions, fearing as he does at the novel’s end the
threatening hate-mail from “A Group of Patriotic Englishmen” who warn
him: “If you make any more of your dirty pacifist speeches, we shall deal
with you as you deserve…You do not deserve this warning, but we want to
behave sportingly even towards a skunk like you” (464). These comically
mild-mannered bullies still cause Anthony great alarm, and he wonders
whether he can manage to continue his peace work or whether he might
retreat, as Huxley ultimately did, from the world of physical danger. Huxley
provides an idiosyncratic, self-interrogating form without a corresponding
mythical order that might root his aesthetic in an identifiable tradition.
Eyeless in Gaza does not present a reworked Buddhist, Hindu, or Christian
mythology in order to reestablish some kind of ancient tradition, but rather
offers, in part through its experimental forms, the self in conflict seeking a
discipline capable of pacifying the world.
Anthony’s views in any given chapter of the book are opposed or
contradicted in preceding and following chapters, showing his internal development to be a series of false starts and missteps rather than a gradual
accumulation of personal virtue culminating in enlightened Nirvana or any
other pure existential plane. For example, chapters sixteen through eighteen take us from June 19, 1912, to May 26, 1934, to December 8, 1926, in
a succession that begins in Anthony’s youthful, bourgeois naiveté, passes
through musings on “peace literature,” and ends with the General Strike.
In all of these phases we are made aware of Anthony’s struggle to develop
political maturity. The twenty-year-old Anthony of chapter sixteen strolls
with his friend Brian Foxe, using garrulousness to cover his guilt for having gotten drunk with other friends rather than keeping his promise to
join Brian at the Fabian Society meeting the previous day. Brian is a true
believer in the Fabian political philosophy, and he tells Anthony through
stammering speech that “B-being a scholar or an artist—it’s l-like purs-suing
your own p-personal salvation. But there’s also the k-kingdom of G-god.
W-waiting to be realized” (93). Anthony age twenty doubts that Fabianism
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is the realization of the kingdom of God, but he has no alternative and offers
instead a sophomoric stream of chatter on subjects literary, philosophical,
and political: “the poetry of Edward Thomas as they walked down Beaumont Street; in Bergson opposite Worcester; crossing Hythe Bridge, in the
nationalization of coal mines” (157).
Much more central than politics to this phase of Anthony’s life is
his sexual awakening with a woman ten years his senior. Anthony goes from
Brian to a romantic boat ride with Mrs. Mary Amberley, which includes a
Lawrentian description of their physical intensity displaced onto the mechanics of boating: “Handling his long pole with an easy mastery of which
he was proud, he felt, as he watched her, exultantly strong and superior.
She was a woman, he a man. He lifted his trailing punt pole and swung it
forward with a movement of easy grace, of unhurried and accomplished
power. Thrust it down into the mud, tightened his muscles against its resistance” (168). Two chapters later, this fervid boating is entirely replaced
by Anthony’s revulsion at Mary’s middle-age (she is in 1926 now forty-four)
and her gauche friend Beppo Bowles who “popped over [to Berlin] to get
away from the General Strike” and to revel in the transgressive sexuality
available in Germany (175). While chapter sixteen shows Anthony’s insouciance, chapter eighteen depicts the political shallowness of members of an
avant-garde who relish any blandly fashionable transgression of middleclass values but who disdain the collective politics of striking workers.
Overt discussion of pacifist views is sandwiched between these
other phases of Anthony’s political growth, making pacifism a point in his
journey rather than a final stop. Inserted between chapters depicting the
young and the aging Anthony’s political irresponsibility is one of the several
diary entries written by Anthony, himself now having reached the “revolting”
age of forty-four, deep into his pacifist conversion. In chapter seventeen,
Anthony tests his vocation while presenting himself as a sage. He attacks
the religious function of chauvinistic nationalism and its propensity for violence: “One of the great attractions of patriotism—it fulfills our worst wishes.
In the person of our nation we are able, vicariously, to bully and cheat…
with a feeling that we’re profoundly virtuous” (171). The diary chapters do
offer Huxley the chance to indulge in the essay form that he favored over
novel-writing. Yet there is a tentative quality to his writing here, and the
views of Anthony are quickly subsumed in the overall structure of the book,
shifting as it does from May of 1934 to December of 1926 and highlighting
the casual dismissiveness Anthony’s circle has toward the General Strike,
the selfishness of their loves, and the casual intellectualism of their reading
habits (Gibbon, Bergson, minor poetry, etc.). The diary form allows Huxley
to present Anthony’s thought as a spontaneous work in progress as he formulates his views: “Good international policies are projections of individual
good intentions and benevolent wishes, and must be of the same kind as
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good inter-personal policies. Pacifist propaganda must be aimed at people
as well as their governments; must start simultaneously at the periphery
and the centre” (172). These speculations about the relationship between
individual conversion and changing state policies seem half-baked, as does
a later proposal that universal love is the key to international peace. Huxley
appears to overstate the power of individual choice here, but the surrounding chapters demonstrate the power of systems and even internal desires
over the free will of an individual. The diary chapters do not stand out as
the triumphal, definitive statement to which the other chapters humbly
defer. Incidents and ideas in the novel are not merely props for Huxley’s
mystical social statements, and the succession of chapters creates a sense
that no single proposition is entirely sufficient or dominant. The novel is
unambiguously in favor of pacifism, but the formal complexity allows Anthony’s pacifist awakening to emerge as a key feature in the landscape of
his life rather than the sole focus of the narrative.
The fractured chronological form of Eyeless in Gaza allows Huxley
to explore another principle that he found central to pacifist practices—unity,
which demands that we see all things as interconnected. Peace activism in
small areas of life (dietary and sexual habits, for example) affects larger scale
politics like governments and national conflicts. In his development of the
fractured chronology which produces unexpected unity, Huxley enters the
time-philosophy debates that preoccupied many modernist writers. The
dismissive reference to Bergson in Anthony’s conversations with Brian, for
example, signals Huxley’s alignment with modernist notions of time felt as
disjunction and fragmentation rather than some vital flow. Wyndham Lewis’
assault on Henri Bergson and all writers he (supposedly) influenced—Stein,
Joyce, Woolf, Sorel, etc.—is the most hostile and expansive version of this
position .16 Lewis claimed that Bergson’s influence on creative art was a blind
submission to the “Great God Flux” which sapped his contemporaries of
their truly revolutionary capacities. In a characteristically venomous blast,
he wrote in 1926 that “It is the plunge into the stream of life, smashing the
watchtowers, Baudelaires, ‘light-houses’ (as the futurists recommended),
identifying yourself with the fluid and the natural […] that produces the
typical conventional modernist, false-revolutionary tendency […] I can
hardly imagine any way in which he [Bergson] is not against every form of
intelligent life” (338). Though their attitudes, assumptions, and aesthetics
differ on almost all counts, Huxley seems to align with Lewis. His novel
opens with Anthony perusing his old photo album, sourly observing that
certain women’s fashions so attractive at one time now seem distinctly
“anti-aphrodisiac” (1). Though Eyeless in Gaza is a book of memories, these
memories emerge like the snapshots in the novel’s opening chapter—less
nostalgic than embarrassing and distasteful. These memories build upon
each other not as a smooth, steady progression from one moment to the
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next, but rather jostle together like jagged fragments. Although meditation
is ultimately one of Anthony’s, and Huxley’s, treasured practices, valuable
as a political weapon in the pacifist arsenal, the idea of self-analysis receives
much rough handling through the novel. Huxley puts in Anthony’s mouth
a scathing description of Proust:
that asthmatic seeker of lost time squatting, horribly white and flabby, with breasts almost female
but fledged with long black hairs, for ever squatting
in the tepid bath of his remembered past. And all
the stale soap suds of countless previous washings
floated around him […] And there he sat, a pale
repellent invalid, taking up spongefuls of his own
thick soup and squeezing it over his face […] (6)
Anthony finds in Proust a failed Tiresias: not quite androgynous, unable
to be fully enchanted, and certainly unable to be authentically visionary.
Here in one form of contemplative modernism, self-reflection is just the
sort of bad prayer Dr. Miller criticizes, a return to one’s own excretion. Like
Wyndham Lewis, Huxley attacks the modernist aesthetic of Bergsonian
flow, preferring a splintered, satirical approach to the novel. Huxley gives
us no overall blessing for contemplation, and the time structure adds to his
contradictory vision of spiritual discipline.
With a straightforward chronology, Eyeless in Gaza might have
suggested a simplistic message where Anthony’s progression of life experiences would culminate in spiritual and political sagacity. But the disjointed
narration fractures this simplistic moral and accentuates another key feature of the novel’s complex expression of pacifism: the recurrent images
of bloodshed. A consistent presence of violence permeates the novel and
contributes to the unity of all things despite the palpable disjunction of time.
In Brian Foxe’s suicide, Anthony’s mother’s early death, the newspaper
reports of young men killed in the Boer War, and many other moments of
carnage, Anthony’s life is shot through with violence that he scarcely has
the resources to endure. One notable example is the famous (or notorious)
“dog episode” which occurs early in the text (though its setting on August
30, 1933 makes it one of the later events of the story). Anthony and his
lover Helen are interrupted during their tryst by the “clattering roar” of an
aeroplane above them. Anthony curses the plane, disturbed partly by its
noise and partly by its viewpoint: “These damned machines!...They’ll have
a nice God’s-eye view of us here…David and Bathsheba” (113). His guilty
conscience is pricked along with his irritation at being bothered during
love-making. But the scene takes a magical realist turn as the air is “punctuated” by “a strange yelping sound,” an explosive thud a yard from where
they are lying, and the sight of “a red pool at their feet [in which] lay the
almost shapeless carcase of a fox terrier” (113). Anthony tries to quip away
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his discomfort, saying “Yet another reason for disliking dogs” and telling
the blood-spattered Helen that she looks like Lady Macbeth (114). Helen,
in shock and horror un-mollified by Anthony’s humor, flees his side and
ends their affair. It would be tempting to see bursts of violence like this one
as Huxley’s condemnation of war through negative imagery. However, the
absurd violence undoubtedly has a purifying effect by forcing the pair to face
their illusions. At the same time, the dog scene surrealistically foreshadows
war trauma with an image similar to the cow’s skull on the beach at the
beginning of Jacob’s Room. But whereas Woolf slipped the skull image into
the quiet texture of her descriptions, Huxley makes this event hilarious and
bizarre, foregrounding the violence rather than the psychological effect.
Susan Venter has an even more favorable view of the dog scene, arguing
that it portrays Huxley’s turn away from the idiosyncratic religion of his
friend D. H. Lawrence: “the death of the dog implies the symbolic death
of ‘the animal’—that ‘mystique’ of the body postulated by Lawrence” and
thus suggests that “meaningfulness replaces meaninglessness” (19). As a
blood rite, the dog scene is certainly evocative, and some form of cleansing
does occur for Anthony and Helen, but reading this moment simply as an
effective ritual neglects the problematic linking of horrific violence with a
pacifist conversion. If bloodshed has ritual properties, can even function
as a means toward wholeness, then what basis can be given for saying that
properly conducted warfare cannot have this same purification rite? Huxley offers us a contradictory tableau that undermines simple mythological
or religious readings. The struggle for authentic peace-making intimately
unites the pacifist with the world’s violence which cannot be easily controlled
or contained by the narrative.
The dog episode displays its contradictions which resurface even
as the novel concludes with Anthony’s lyrical glorification of Unity as his
foundational belief:
Frenzy of evil and separation. In peace there is
unity. Unity with other lives. Unity with all being. For beneath all being, beneath the countless
identical but separate patterns, beneath the attractions and repulsions, lies peace. The same peace
as underlies the frenzy of the mind. Dark peace,
immeasurably deep. (471-72)
He sees unity in his commitment to the Organization, to the pacifist cause,
to his comrades, to Helen his former lover who is now a friend wavering on
the brink of pacifism, and even in enemy love. And unity is the term he finds
to link several of the novel’s striking scenes of bloodshed: “in the drunken
Mexican’s pistol as in the dark dried blood on that mangled face among
the rocks, the fresh blood spattered scarlet over Helen’s naked body, the
drops oozing from the raw contusion on Mark’s knee” (467). Through the
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blood and violence and political mistakes of Anthony’s life, he struggles to
achieve a worthwhile pacifist presence. Rather than a conclusive endpoint,
pacifism is a journey like monasticism, placing Anthony outside mainstream
national and religious identities. As Huxley wrote during his own conversion,
pacifism “entails devoted and unremitting personal service for the cause…
peace is the by-product of a certain way of life” (qtd. in Dunaway 22). The
form of Eyeless in Gaza—a certain way of writing—attempts to portray that
impersonal yet somehow purposeful organization of life. A disjointed yet
unified life emerges through the shifts back and forth in time and our experience of Anthony’s vacillating philosophy, religion, politics, and erotic loves.
No simple didacticism, Eyeless in Gaza evinces through every
chapter an enduring struggle with personal convictions, public actions,
physical desires, and intellectual pursuits. The novel’s title lifts from Milton
the image of Samson, blind and bound, caught in slave labor for the very
tribe he was prophesied to vanquish for Israel’s freedom:
…O glorious strength
Put to the labour of a Beast, debas’t
Lower then bondslave! Promise was that I
Should Israel from Philistian yoke deliver;
Ask for this great Deliverer now, and find him
Eyeless in Gaza at the Mill with slaves,
Himself in bonds under Philistian yoke (443-44)
For a supposedly didactic novel, Huxley’s choice of title is curiously ambiguous. Thematizing bondage and sightlessness as the conditions of the
protagonist would seem to contradict the enlightenment and sage-like
contentment discovered by Anthony as an antidote to the slaveries of
the modern world. Huxley’s lifelong problems with eyesight persistently
emblematized his struggles to be a successful visionary, and this ocular
theme echoes in the choice of title. The Samson of Milton’s chamber drama
bewails his incapacity to fulfill the salvation of Israel by his hand, much as
Anthony is caught at the end of the novel with dedication and perseverance
but without clear sight about how he might proceed. In other words, the
agony of this process is more pronounced than the success of the mystical
pacifist visionary.
Pacifist Afterlife
By the time Europe had fully embarked upon the Second World War, many
leading figures in the PPU and other parts of the peace movement abandoned the pacifist convictions they held so fervently in the 1930s. Beverley
Nichols, whose pacifist screed Cry Havoc! of 1933 had been widely admired
throughout Britain, made an about-face publishing Men Do Not Weep in
1941 where he imagines an autobiographical novel called “Death of a Pacifist”
which celebrates the legions of ex-pacifists in barracks “forming threes in
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khaki” (7). John Middleton Murry, Storm Jameson, Rose Macaulay, and
many others also gave resignations, publicly declaring their former ignorance and newfound realism in matters of warfare.
But Huxley was not among them. His retreat from pacifist activism was quieter, more private. He maintained interest in pacifism, but his
efforts turned toward rebuilding civilization after the war. He affirmed his
brother Julian’s 1941 pamphlet “Reconstruction and Peace,” and he would
offer his own brief commentary on rebuilding society in the book Science,
Liberty, and Peace (1946).17 His final novel, Island (1962) was still part of
this effort to imagine a world without violent, technocratic wreckage. The
British peace movement and Huxley’s activism were never again as forceful
as they were in 1936, and this year marks a high point for their struggle. As
Huxley wrote to Leonard Woolf, the “pacifist way may not succeed; but on
the other hand it might. And if it succeeded only partially, the international
atmosphere wd [sic] be cleared” (Letters 401). Though pacifism seemed to
die for many 1930s activists, efforts toward a just internationalism as a form
of violence reduction suggest that the ideals of anti-war activism persist in
a kind of afterlife evident in modern peace-building. Huxley’s great novel
of 1936 remains a testament to the struggle for personal and political unity
through chaotic and fragmentary modernist forms, literary expression that
enacts the confusing, difficult work of not just pledging but living for peace.
Notes
1. See S. Krishnamoorthy Aithal, who conducts an elaborate reordering of
the chapters as evidence for a claim that Huxley composed the novel chronologically and then shuffled the chapters. Aithal idiosyncratically suggests
that the order of the chapters lends itself to six groups that correspond to
the letters in “HUXLEY” or “BEAVIS.” For examples of less far-reaching
analyses which connect formalist readings to Huxley’s philosophical influences, see May and Wasserman. David King Dunaway also repeats the
apocryphal story that Huxley drafted the novel chronologically and cut his
typescript with scissors. See Dunaway’s “Introduction” to Eyeless in Gaza.
2. In a lengthy letter of 30 July, 1939 to his brother Julian, Aldous describes
this commitment to the “Bates Method” (Letters 441-43).
3.  The exact number for this peak membership fluctuates depending on
the source. This figure comes from the most reliable expert on British peace
movements, Martin Ceadel. See Pacifism in Britain 1914-1945.
4. Mark Gilbert, for instance, chronicles “the strikingly equivocal nature
of the Peace Pledge Union’s (PPU) views of Hitlerite Germany” and notes
that “apologist tendencies were widespread among the PPU’s leading intellectuals and writers” (493).
5. Even the most contentious issue on the ballot, which poses a hypothetical
last resort of military measures for an attacking nation, was supported by
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about 58% while approximately 20% renounced this idea and another 20%
refused to answer. This data suggests a deep ambivalence within the British
public about further warfare except as the very last resort. See Cortright for
full results of the survey plus detailed analysis of its implications (76-79).
See also Ceadel’s Semi-Detached Idealists (317-19).
6. See Cortright for peace activism against appeasement (79-81).
7. See Ceadel Semi-Detached Idealists (326-27).
8. Despite its apparent failure, it is worth noting that the PPU still exists
today and calls itself the “oldest secular pacifist organization in Britain.”
More information can be found at its website: <www.ppu.org.uk>.
9. For more on this phase of Huxley’s alternative military career, see Dunaway, Huxley in Hollywood (14-17).
10. The working relationship between Huxley and Heard has been the
subject of several studies. See, for instance, Nugel and Eros.
11.  Despite his eccentrism, Gregg’s influence was surprisingly long-lasting.
Martin Luther King was an admirer of the book and supplied a foreword for
one of its later editions, writing “I hope [The Power of Nonviolence] gets a
wide readership, particularly among those, in this country and throughout
the world, who are seeking ways of achieving full social, personal and political freedom in a manner consistent with human dignity” (9).
12.   Heard’s manifesto for the new pacifism can be found in The New
Pacifism edited by Gerald Hibbert, which contains essays by many writers
including Huxley, Beverly Nichols, and A. A. Milne.
13. West’s book began its life when she reported on the treason trials of
William Joyce and John Amery for The New Yorker. Her first book-length
study of what she called the “story of disloyalty” (West vii) was called The
Meaning of Treason and was published in 1949 and a revised, expanded version called The New Meaning of Treason appeared in 1964. Sybil Morrison
notes that the quoted line from the 1949 text was removed from subsequent
editions of the text “after a lengthy correspondence between the General
Secretary [of the PPU] and the publishers” (51). Morrison tartly adds: “Rebecca West herself consistently refused to see the General Secretary or to
make any apology” (51).
14.  Ceadel calls this isolationist position “quasi-pacifism” adopted by anyone who accepts fighting as long as they are not involved with it (Pacifism
in Britain 10).
15. For further analysis of the controversies within the PPU over Gregg’s
method of “moral jiu-jitsu,” see Ceadel’s Pacifism in Britain (252-57).
16. Lewis’s lengthiest treatise against Bergson, et. al. is Time and Western
Man (1927).
17. See Letters 471-72.
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